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An Altered State? Emergent Changes to Illicit Drug Markets and Distribution 
Networks in Scotland 
 
Introduction 
Illicit drugs are big business and an even bigger public health problem (Stevens, 
2011), but research on the ‘realities’ of drug markets is surprisingly thin (Antonopoulos & 
Papanicolaou, 2010, p. 3). This is especially true in Scotland, which despite its unique drug 
problem profile (Casey et al. 2009), has been either neglected by drugs scholars or subsumed 
under studies of UK–wide drugs markets (e.g., Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007). To address 
this gap, the current study draws upon interviews with 42 illicit drug suppliers who 
successfully operated at retail, wholesale or middle market, and importation levels of the 
market in Scotland.  Our results provide a holistic view of the characteristics and dynamics of 
Scotland’s drug market, whilst alerting us that significant changes to this market are already 
underway. We begin by analysing the extant literature on Scottish drug markets within a UK 
context.   
Literature Review 
As noted by Coomber (2015), the UK drug market is highly differentiated with no 
unified market but rather a ‘series of loosely interlinked local and regional markets’ (Pearson 
& Hobbs, 2001, p. vii).  Drug markets typically are compartmentalized into international 
(importation), national/regional (wholesale or middle market), and local (retail) levels 
(Lupton et al., 2002; Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007). Local retail markets are further 
differentiated, however, as open, semi-open (e.g., pub and club-based) and closed, trust-
based, markets (May & Hough, 2004).  
The majority of drugs are sold or distributed in the UK in community settings (Hales 
& Hobbs, 2010), by non-gang affiliated dealers working within friendship networks (Parker, 
2000; Taylor & Potter, 2013), or by individual entrepreneurs ‘going solo’ (Windle & Briggs, 
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2015a). Commercially motivated ‘real dealers’ (Stevenson, 2008), the focus of the current 
study, however, are more likely to be organised into ‘associational criminal structures’ (Von 
Lampe, 2016), sustained partially via kinship and ethnicity (Pearson & Hobbs, 2001), or 
drugs gangs for whom illicit enterprise is integral to collective identity (Densley, 2014). 
The Scottish Parliament (2017) has highlighted that problem drug use is 
disproportionately high in Scotland compared to England and Wales, and that the 706 drug-
related deaths recorded in 2015 was the highest on record. Drug harms generate an 
approximate cost of around £3.5 billion annually to the Scottish economy (Casey et al. 2009). 
Against this backdrop, the Scottish National Party (SNP) pledged to make Scotland ‘drug 
free’ by 2019 (Scottish Government 2008). To achieve this objective, the Scottish 
Government’s (2015) Serious Organised Crime Strategy (SOCS) is focused on dismantling 
drug supply. 
Few studies of the illegal drugs market in Scotland currently exist. May and Hough 
(2004) outline two market forms in Scotland as being dominant: a top down pyramid model 
and a highly-fragmented model. Adopting a top down perspective, Preble and Casey (1969) 
outline a three-tier model, with drugs being imported into the country before being passed to 
wholesalers and then retail-level distributors. Coope and Bland (2004) outline a similar 
model as being applicable to the contemporary Scottish context, taking into account 
globalisation processes that influence the size and scale of the illegal drugs market. In the 
context of drug markets, globalisation can be defined as the widening of markets from 
monopolistic to competitive structures; the opening up of borders that subsequently leads to 
an influx of high- and low- level traffickers; and reduced transport, communication, and 
information costs that, in turn, increase international trade and help conceal drug transactions 
(Storti & De Grauwe, 2009b).  
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McPhee et al. (2009) note that while a hierarchical model may be the most applicable 
to the Scottish drugs market, there is a distinct lack of empirical evidence in this area. 
McPhee’s (2012, p. 245) later work on drug distribution indeed found very ‘few participants, 
who would describe themselves as dealers, although it was clear that several had engaged in 
small-scale commercial enterprises’. In this case, social sellers had started to become more 
entrepreneurial, a finding consistent with studies outside of Scotland that find ‘minimally 
commercial supply’ (Coomber & Moyle, 2014) extending out of informal ‘social supply,’ 
which itself exists in the grey area between commercial drug dealing and possession for 
personal use (Aldridge et al., 2011; Coomber et al. 2015), and is especially important for 
young people’s access to cannabis (Coomber & Turnbull, 2007). 
A recent study exploring the dynamics of heroin markets in three Scottish case study 
areas (Cyster & Rowe, 2006), moreover, found that heroin was so widely available and 
geographically widespread that conventional wisdom about illicit drugs markets needed 
revisiting. To this end, McLean, Densley and Deuchar (2018a) have shed light on the hidden 
role of street gangs in drug distribution in Scotland. Following similar trends observed in 
London (e.g., Densley, 2014; Harding, 2014), McLean et al. found that gangs have evolved to 
not necessarily control drug markets, but to participate in them and benefit from territorial 
control of a marketplace (see also, McLean, 2018; McLean et al., 2018b). The authors 
likewise note that while the term ‘gang’ is often applied in a stereotypical manner by those in 
the political establishment and media as representing a cohesive criminal group (Deuchar, 
2009, 2016), in reality there are significant variations between gangs in regard to hierarchy, 
division of labour, cohesion, and purpose (Densley, 2012). Indeed, it is not uncommon for 
members to even be part of several ‘gangs’ at once. Thus, how gangs present themselves may 
range from somewhat informal collectives to highly solidified groups (McLean, 2018). 
However, while the motivation to supply drugs is often individualized, there has been a 
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growing tendency in recent years for dealers, and in particular retail dealers, to come together 
with likeminded individuals to reduce risk and victimization, and pool resources, in what is a 
highly competitive, and inherently dangerous, market (McLean et al., 2018a). 
In the past decade, moreover, media sources indicate Scottish police (working with 
local, national, and international law enforcement partners) have had considerable success in 
surveillance and disruption of Serious and Organised Crime Groups (SOCG) involved in 
large scale drug importation. In 2005, for example, three members of a Glasgow drugs gang 
were jailed for life (The Times, 2005), and in 2010, the ringleader of a national cocaine and 
heroin operation based in Edinburgh was jailed for 10 years (BBC, 2010). In 2013, eight 
members of a Liverpool-based drugs gang, including seven from Scotland, were jailed for 
supplying tens of millions of pounds worth of cocaine and heroin to Glasgow (BBC, 2010). 
And in 2018, members of an SOCG described at trial as ‘the most sophisticated encountered 
by Police Scotland’ were jailed for 87 years for violence, drugs, and firearms offences. 
Described as ‘wholesalers to other organised crime groups’, the SOCG undertook the 
‘importation of vast quantities of cocaine’ from South America and were ‘at the top of the 
chain in terms of drugs transactions in Scotland and the UK as a whole’ operating across 
central Scotland and the north of England (O’Hare, 2018). Such law enforcement activity is 
important because it both highlights, and simultaneously sets the stage for, the market 
changes described below.  
 
The Current Study 
Modifications to drugs markets often remain unexplored by scholars long after 
becoming adopted practice because markets are considerably under-researched. Drug market 
research is often focused on structural elements, e.g., ‘middle markets’ (Pearson & Hobbs, 
2001), retail distribution (Desroches, 2007), or on a single drug type (Briggs, 2010), thus 
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broad changes at all market levels, or examples of intersectionality, get missed. For example, 
whilst it is true the internet has disrupted traditional drug markets, online sales remain 
‘anchored’ in offline drug markets (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016) and face-to-face 
transactions still dictate the vast majority of retail-level transactions, especially with regard to 
heroin and crack cocaine, which have a distinct consumer profile (Coomber, 2015). Thus, 
acquiring an aggregate view of UK, or Scottish, drug markets can be complicated, often only 
surfacing via general prevalence survey or government report every ten years (e.g., Bennett & 
Holloway, 2007). 
In contrast, the present study has captured voices of active drug offenders in 
community contexts who articulate how the existing hierarchical model of Scottish drug 
markets and distribution now appears to be in a state of flux. Several reasons emerge from 
our research as to why this is happening: (a) risk mitigation by importers and distributors, 
related in part to successful police intervention; and (b) market diversification of both product 
and demand, partially tied to globalisation. It is believed these changes have resulted in 
modifications to distribution networks, which may continue to evolve over the coming years. 
In this paper, we seek to provide a holistic view of the dynamics and characteristics of 
Scotland’s drug markets by focusing in depth on the elements of importation and distribution. 
Prior to doing this, we provide the methodology for our study, illustrating how we accessed 
participants. Drawing upon salient extracts from semi-structured interviews, we then examine 
the structure of the Scottish drug market and how it is in flux. We focus on the market rather 
than different ‘types’ of drug dealers, because drug distribution is complex and considerable 
‘overlap’ exists between ‘different patterns of supply’ (Potter, 2009, p. 52). Finally, we 
discuss the impact of these changes for those involved in the drug markets at each level, 
finishing with a review of implications for policy and policing.  
Method 
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Data were gathered between 2012 and 2016 as part of a broader qualitative study of 
crime in Glasgow, Scotland (see AUTHOR 2017). Participant criteria was defined as: (a) 
previous experience of gang or group offending; (b) previous engagement in practices 
identified by Police Scotland as serious and organised crime, that is, the provision of illegal 
goods and services for profit (Scottish Government 2015); and (c) aged 16 years and older. 
We acknowledge that by focusing on participants embedded in gangs and organised crime, 
the voices of small-scale drug dealers and social sellers who are not gang members are 
excluded, and this is a limitation. Still, we present data from a unique ‘hard-to-reach’ sample 
population (Bhopal & Deuchar, 2016), that was accessed via a combined purposive and 
snowball sample that started with frontline practitioners in outreach projects acting as 
gatekeepers (an approach common in studies of gangs and criminal networks, e.g., Densley, 
2013). In total, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 ex-offenders 
and 32 active offenders. 34 were male and 8 were female. These 42 participants all were aged 
between 16 and 35 years of age. All respondents were raised in Glasgow ‘schemes’, 
characterised by high levels of deprivation (see Miller, 2015).  
The interviews encouraged participants to reflect upon criminal trajectories arising 
from childhood and it was found that all 42 respondents had been involved in retail-level 
drug supply at some time. Despite variation in the quantity/bulk that participants purchased 
and distributed, 26 males and three females had engaged in wholesale practices. Seven 
participants had gone on to be involved in the importation and trafficking of drugs into the 
country. Because lower level retailers may not be as well informed about wholesaling and 
trafficking, we have prioritized voices from within each market level. In terms of product, all 
study participants had sold cannabis at some time. Heroin, cocaine, and to a lesser extent 
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ecstasy, were the most common Class A drugs sold,1 with over 80 percent of the sample 
doing so. Cannabis was the most popular Class B drug, but amphetamines, barbiturates, and 
other drugs were also discussed.  
Open-ended, in-depth interviews allowed participants to convey, unrestricted, their 
own subjective understanding of drug markets. Interviews typically lasted one hour, with up 
to five interview sessions scheduled per participant. Most interviews were conducted one-to-
one, although two group interviews (n=4 and 5) were held. Data were triangulated via 
discussion with other interviewees and gatekeepers. On occasion, interviewees voluntarily 
provided corroborating evidence (i.e., media articles, criminal records, etc.). Interviews were 
digitally transcribed and analysed thematically. Ethical approval was granted by the 
researcher’s home institution. 
Findings 
Market Structure and Risk Mitigation 
The UK is predominantly an end-user of drugs, except for cannabis which is also 
locally produced. Consistent with UNODC (2016) data, respondents said that heroin came in 
overland from the opium fields of Afghanistan, through Turkey and the Balkans, or in some 
cases was transhipped via boat or air from Pakistan. Cocaine came from South America via 
Jamaica, North Africa, and Spain, and ecstasy and other synthetics arrived from The 
Netherlands (SOCA, 2009). International importation into Scotland was uncommon, 
respondents said, because most points of entry were from England or Northern Ireland. 
Indeed, respondents argued that in Scotland wholesaling was preferable to importing, and in 
some cases more profitable, owing to the transportation and storage risks/costs and the 
logistical challenges associated with sourcing drugs. Where trafficking did occur, however, it 
                                                          
1 The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, with amendments, is the main law regulating drug use in the 
UK. It divides controlled substances into three classes: A, B and C. Class A is the category 
which attracts the most severe penalties for possession, supply and trafficking. 
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followed a hierarchical supply model (Pearson & Hobbs, 2001). For example, during one of 
the interviews, Sean explained: 
 
Not everyone can import stuff…. They (the importers) sell large to a few guys who 
[then] move it on to people who sell it in smaller bulks … not everyone would buy the 
same amount. . .. Depends. 
 
From Dean’s perspective, individuals in high level importing often retained particular 
privileged positions or roles in society that could be leveraged to their advantage, including 
connections to high level criminals who could set up ‘underworld’ connections on their 
behalf: 
 
[Those involved] in high end drug distribution basically control the market…. [lower 
dealers] work for them, [but] no[t] always directly. Most people don’t even probably 
know they get [drugs] off them…. Being involved in [OC] means they can turn to 
corrupt cops. 
 
When inquiring as to those who imported drugs internationally, Sean elaborated: 
 
I’ve only met [the individuals who] bring the stuff in, but they won’t be the actual 
guys arranging the smuggling [from outside the UK]. They are like representatives 
[in the UK], obviously working for [traffickers outside the UK]. Probably [extended] 
family or something. 
 
 
 
9 
 
Although Sean made reference to networks based upon familial or ethnic ties, this was 
in regards to those who have direct handling of the drugs being imported. Sean spoke from 
the perspective of a ‘runner’ who is in direct contact with the designee or representative(s) of 
the regional wholesaler(s); who Pearson and Hobbs’ (2001) refer to as the ‘face’.  
Interviewee William explained, traffickers have in recent years changed their airborne 
smuggling tactics to minimise risk and reduce opportunities for police and customs officials 
to intervene. He compared past methods of smuggling, whereby organised criminals would 
import directly, with more contemporary methods of tempting outsiders to act as mules and 
import drugs on behalf of the organisation. Powder cocaine was transported and smuggled 
into Scotland through various means, for example, including by air: 
 
[It] use[d] to be popular for someone to travel to like Columbia, [or] the Caribbean 
countries instead, and bring it over on flights. That isn’t really done now but….thing 
is, just paying someone to do it…. Like daft wee boys, offer them a holiday, a week 
away, and set them up to meet [OCG representative] while there….just mules 
basically. Fuck it, if they get caught it’s them that gets [apprehended]… changes up 
the custom profiling, know. –William 
 
With only two international airports in Scotland, such use of drug mules was highly risky and 
restricted to small amounts of high quality drugs at any one time, usually from Spain or The 
Netherlands. To mitigate the risks, international importation was more routinely undertaken 
via sea routes. The Scottish west coast has multiple sea lochs (inlets) making (often 
undetected) importation comparatively easy. Moreover, SOCGs have sophisticated networks 
of contacts remunerated for ease of importation. For instance, William argued it was not 
uncommon for only one, or a select few, crew on maritime vessels, shipping containers, and 
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pleasure boats to be aware of drugs being transported on-board. William said it was not 
money, but rather fear of reprisals for missing cargo or seizures that kept people honest: 
 
Smuggle that shit in from everywhere... Say gear (cocaine), right, is coming in on a 
particular boat. The guys getting their hands dirty aren’t the ones arranging it all, 
no…. takes a bit more brains than that…. If it’s coming in on a ship, there will be say, 
inside guys, working the dock, emptying containers, that know, HGV drivers… they 
get a cut (paid) for just moving it along…. Most of the workers don’t know what’s 
going on…. Might not be the best [wage for those transporting] but you don’t bump 
these guys arranging it…. [or] they will get you fuckin’ done in, if you get caught 
dipping goods. 
 
While William indicated that pay to those maritime workers undertaking 
transportation was ‘not the best,’ this was in relation to what the wholesalers were making, or 
what maritime workers could themselves earn if they became independent suppliers to 
wholesalers in their own right. Further, William and others argued that it was not uncommon 
for those involved in logistical supply to do so to pay off outstanding drug and gambling 
debts of their own.  
As international importation carries significant risks, these were best mitigated by 
importation into England followed by ground transportation to Scotland.  Participants 
involved in high level wholesaling discussed how they had a steady supply from known 
sources and that UK–based representatives were easier to contact and work with than foreign 
suppliers. As William said: ‘Once off, it might be transported right to [a] yard, whatever, or 
sometimes, depending on bulk, someone will collect directly’. This was where the first 
exchange of money in country took place: 
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We got it right from the [source in Scotland], well so we were told… don’t get much 
bigger that I’ve heard of…. Moving [heroin] brought [good income]….[between] 
£10,000-£20,000 for each bulk shift[ed]…. Would [sell] to people to [supply 
thereafter]…. [if] we earned £10,000 [though] …. [It] get[s] [divided] up [with 
group members]. –Conner  
 
Conner implied that whilst he was informed of who his supplier was, he was sceptical 
because importers rarely if at all handled drugs directly, but rather delegated the task to their 
associates. 
Importation into England was generally secured into one of four centres or cities 
operating as national supply ‘hubs’, i.e., London, Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester 
(NCA, 2016).  From here ‘mid-level’ distributors bulk-buy drugs from importers before 
transportation to smaller regional hubs like Glasgow, where drugs are sold to local 
wholesalers and established sellers, who, in turn, distribute to lower-level retail sellers 
(Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007), and ‘user dealers’ (Moyle & Coomber, 2015).  
Most drugs therefore enter Scotland primarily via northern England. Many 
participants talked about making ‘runs’, ‘collections’, or ‘pick-ups’ from ‘south of the 
border’, with Liverpool and Manchester most frequently cited as collection points. It was not 
uncommon for middle-level dealers to mitigate risk by employing (both directly and 
indirectly) young people loosely embedded in criminal networks to travel to make ‘pick-ups’ 
for them and drop money in return: 
 
[Individual X] always meets me once there…. No, they don’t meet us half way or 
nothing. I have to drive right to [Merseyside area] …. [we don’t always rendezvous] 
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at same place…. I hand over the bag [of money], no[t] to him, in his hands… put it 
somewhere… mostly [in his] car trunk… [or] leave it for him under the table if we 
are at [restaurant X] … [and] he leaves with it…. [once back in Glasgow] I make a 
drop off to [an associate], and they hold onto it. –Dee 
 
Traffickers operating on Scotland’s East Coast, notably the Lothians and the Scottish 
capital Edinburgh, also reported alliances with suppliers in the English Midlands, many of 
whom were labelled ‘Yardies’ by our white respondents because they conformed to 
stereotypes of black criminality (for a discussion, see Karim, 1999). A number of participants 
described making large collections from Birmingham: 
 
Quite a few boys from around [Scotland’s East Coast] had strong alliances with 
[censored group name] from down Birmingham way… [they] put me in touch, know, 
hooked me up…. Most [of] the pickups used to come from around Liverpool, know, 
but for a few years there, I’m telling you, [significant] amounts of like pure (potent 
drug quality) was coming in from there (Birmingham)…. especially Skag (heroin)… 
from Pakistan and [Afghanistan] know …. Was a heavy outfit going, [that] ran a lot 
of the shit coming into Scotland for a while… dried up a good bit… few guys making 
strong connections back with the Liverpool mobs again. –Donnie 
 
It was after being ‘hooked up’ via connections on the East Coast that Donnie, who 
was in fact based on Scotland’s West Coast, started dealing directly with those from in and 
around Birmingham. Owing to globalisation and immigration patterns, Birmingham had 
emerged as a source of a better and more consistent supply of heroin for Scottish customers. 
Storti and De Grauwe (2009b) have drawn attention to the way in which globalisation affects 
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the retail market by reducing the import cost of drugs while also increasing the availability of 
drug dealers. Accordingly, globalisation was a prominent factor in increasing the degree of 
competition in drug markets, thus heightening the diversification of drug distribution patterns 
(Storti & De Grauwe, 2009a). However, the Birmingham pipeline eventually ‘dried up’, 
Donnie said, forcing West Coast importers to go back to more durable, traditional alliances 
with importers in Liverpool and Manchester. Another example of the market was always 
adapting to changes in quality, supply and price.   
 Further adaptive strategies saw the relatively recent emergence of Northern Ireland as 
a UK regional hub for drug trafficking. Post the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the province 
witnessed a significant rise in drug markets and the consequent emergence of trafficking 
networks (McElrath, 2004; McSweeny et al., 2008; Coomber, 2009). Owing to geographical 
proximity (coastal Ulster and Scotland being only 12 miles apart) and shared history, the 
West Coast of Scotland was also supplied from Northern Ireland: 
 
[My family member] was heavy moving (supplying significant amounts of drugs) …. 
He was working wi’ cunts from all over Glasgow…. [even] Ireland, going over to 
[Irish city]. –Alpha  
I: How often do you think you go over [to Ireland] then?  
Bee: Catch the Ferry around couple of times a month to meet [individual Z] …. Aye, a 
few at least, I would have to say.  
 
The participants felt Scotland’s West Coast drug traffickers had a strategic advantage 
over those in the East due to geo-proximity and social or family ties to the distribution ‘hubs’ 
in Liverpool, Manchester, and Belfast. This afforded traffickers a consistent supply, first-
hand, to freshly imported drugs. This viewpoint was supported by Police Scotland, who have 
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identified elevated levels of drug supply and disproportionate numbers of drug dealers 
situated in the West of Scotland (Scottish Government, 2015). Participants in the West spoke 
of regularly wholesaling and distributing drugs to contacts in central and east Scotland and, to 
a lesser degree, Northern Scotland (e.g., Aberdeen and the Western Isles).  Some media 
reports of successful police operations to target traffickers cited in the literature review also 
support this West Coast network theory.  It should therefore be considered possible that two 
wholly separate methods of distribution now operate with West Coast distribution differing 
slightly from East Coast arrangements. 
The supply of imported cannabis operated on similar principles to Class A drug 
supply. A few very well-organised criminal syndicates, involving a mixture of career 
criminals and those in privileged positions, arranged for the bulk importation of cannabis, 
often in resin form, into England from Morocco, before further distribution into Scotland. As 
imported cannabis entered mainland Britain much further south than Liverpool or Manchester 
it was not uncommon for midway collection points to be arranged, as noted by Delph: 
   
It gets brought up from London…. That’s where my guy says it comes from when we 
pick up…. Asked him last time I seen him actually, just at [particular service point 
midway]. 
 
However, Delph was the exception not the rule with his bulk buying of cannabis from ‘South 
of the Border’. Other interviewees sourced cannabis in smaller quantities and often in 
combination with other drugs: 
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Wouldn’t ever go to get kilos and kilos of [cannabis], just no’ worth the risk, too 
bulky… when I’m picking up some [ecstasy], more speed…..or [individual Y] always 
flings in a bit when I’m buying [steroids]. –Boab 
 
For many interviewees, their drug dealing careers started with the ‘social supply’ of cannabis 
they purchased from others, but over time they realized they could make more money by 
cultivating the drug themselves. As Melvin explained: 
 
You work with your pals. . .. [you] can trust them to do business wi’. You can’t just 
[initially] start off like big time gangsters (laughs). Really start by selling weed, aye. 
Well we did, aye. Me and [censored name]. Sold weed to wee guys first. Done a few 
grows, you know, a few pots in the cupboard….. not really that hi-tech. .. [as the gang 
progresses in experience] you’d chip in a couple a G[rand] to buy big. 
 
In-house cultivation, often referred to as ‘import substitution’ (Decorte et al., 2011), had 
additional benefits, said respondents, because it gave them control over their product and 
limited the transactional risks involved in buying cannabis (e.g., Belackova et al., 2015). 
William argued domestic ‘homemade factories’ were commonplace, with even ‘law-abiding’ 
citizens getting in on the action: 
 
Cannabis is just grown in factories [in Scotland], I would think… Fuck, everyone 
going has a grow, even if it’s just their own [for personal use]. –William 
 
However, import substitution was not without risks, and some respondents felt that, in the 
end, large-scale cannabis supply was a fruitless endeavour:  
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A few boys doing grows…. Couple selling solid… [most people] don’t…. it’s not 
growing it that’s hard, but you have to stockpile it. Can never fuckin’ sell it all… 
no[t] for what it’s worth. –William 
 
Sure, I got asked to get involved [in a cannabis grow] with [gang A]. I said ‘no 
chance, way too dodgy’. They had been doing well. Like getting’ rented flats, more 
from [associate rough landlord], none of that RightMove shite, you kiddin’…. Put up 
a couple of partition walls, false walls and do a few grows…. In every room… 
[except] living room and kitchen. Windows [and curtains] in them rooms would be 
open…. So cunts aren’t gettin’ pure suspicious, being nosey, aye… rent [the homes] 
for a bit, [then] move….They never had the houses in their names, but [when they 
approached me] this time they were taking out a factory, I was like fuck off…. Ended 
up some cunt took their grow and set fire to the place to get them caught.’ –Greg 
 
Participants continuously stated that the cannabis market was now ‘saturated’, with 
competition benefitting consumers but eating away at margins for suppliers. The time and 
specialist skills required to successfully differentiate one’s brand in the marketplace made 
cannabis growing less attractive for many.  Silverstone and Savage (2010) find that London 
cannabis markets have been monopolised by Vietnamese growers.  The Vietnamese 
community in Scotland is much smaller but recent figures from the National Crime Agency 
(NCA) and the UK National Referral Mechanism (NRM), which monitors victims of modern 
slavery, reported that one third of all potential victims identified in Scotland were 
Vietnamese; suggesting this community is growing.  Reflecting Storti and De Grauwe’s 
(2009a, b) insights that suggest that the process of globalisation has increased the availability 
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of drug dealers while also reducing the import cost of drugs, should such new arrivals from 
Vietnam continue to operate in Scottish drug distribution networks, it might be that the UK 
drugs market ultimately becomes more uniform.  
As discussed, cannabis was often the entry point for drug dealing careers. Reasons for 
dealing cannabis ranged considerably, from the fact that cannabis was easy to buy and sell, to 
the notion that it was a social drug that carried little risk of prosecution. A common theme 
that emerged for participants, however, was quickly progressing onto selling ‘harder drugs’ 
such as cocaine, owing to ready access to established drug markets (also see Windle & 
Briggs, 2015). Often the combination of perceiving themselves as having a somewhat innate 
criminal identity and having easy access to established supply networks via kinship, criminal-
familial, or close friends, resulted in a heightened chance of engaging in drug supply. While 
cannabis was ‘safer’ to move on, the market was viewed as being saturated and cannabis 
itself carried little profit. This combination motivated participants to venture into other drug 
markets deemed more financially lucrative. Yet, part of the challenge was keeping up with 
new trends in drug supply and consumer demand and then responding to this diversifying 
marketplace, all the while looking to avoid, or stand out from, the competition. 
 
Market Diversification and Modifications to Distribution Networks 
Our study has thus far articulated how the existing hierarchical model of Scottish drug 
markets is in a state of flux, owing to increasingly adaptive risk mitigation by importers and 
distributors (in the context of increased law enforcement scrutiny). However, we also found 
that these adaptations have resulted in market diversification of both product and demand, 
and modifications to distribution networks, which we now move on discuss.   
The manner in which drugs are imported into Scotland inevitably affects local level 
distribution networks. The West Coast market is highly lucrative and, as a result, illegal 
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entrepreneurial structures have emerged from underlying social relationships, namely 
friendship networks within the drug world, but also kinship ties. This is consistent with the 
foundational work of Adler (1985) and others. At the centre of the West Coast market sits 
Glasgow. As we have argued elsewhere (AUTHOR), Glasgow’s drugs market is too vast, too 
complex, and too diverse for any one group or individual to try to monopolise it. Instead, 
gangs compete on cost, quality, and delivery of service in a competitive ‘free market’ drugs 
economy. Some groups do well, while others fail. Ultimately, however, the market is large 
enough, diverse enough, and lucrative enough for all who wish to enter to do so.   
Looking at the local level of the city of Glasgow, the ready access to importers means 
that a single ‘scheme’ (or housing estate), can house more than one organised crime group at 
the wholesale level and several street gangs at the retail level (McLean et al., 2018a, b). To 
meet demand, therefore, retailers will access supply from several wholesaling sources. This 
means that whilst there may be multiple drugs gangs in a single housing scheme, they can 
operate independently from one another and in relative peace. Participant Alpha noted: 
 
When you’re young you just fight cunts.... like wee guy shit…. I’m no[t] going to start 
scrappin’ wi’ guys from [another scheme] …. Just [be]cause they are from another 
scheme. That’s daft.  
 
Another interviewee, Mary, likewise talked about supplying drugs to Glasgow through her 
siblings who lived there. Mary’s risk strategy was to stay outside the city limits, thus 
avoiding unwanted police attention.  Her description of working remotely through others, 
even exploiting vulnerable young people and adults to ‘stash gear in their house and sell from 
there’ or ‘puts (sic) a set up in their house’, was reminiscent of the ‘county lines’ and 
‘cuckooing’ (whereby a vulnerable adult’s home is taken over as an operational base) 
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phenomena found in England (NCA, 2015), and now on the radar of Police Scotland (2017). 
As Mary said: 
 
The boys still stay up there. Everyone has phones now don’t they.…[It’s] good down 
here. Quiet, so no’ much people giving any hassle. Hardly any police as well. … loads 
a’ wee villages round about as well…well, basically [Brother C] or [Brother A] 
usually go scope the place first and if it is cool then they start dealing. … you get a 
feel for the place. 
 
The ‘county lines’ supply model (NCA, 2015; Storrod & Densley, 2017; Windle & Briggs, 
2015b) challenges the traditional ‘national’ wholesale and ‘local’ street dealing dichotomy 
because it involves dealers in hub cities ‘commuting’ to provincial markets to both wholesale 
and retail their product (Coomber & Moyle, 2017). Andell and Pitts (2017, p.11) note such 
distribution methods have arisen due to saturation of big city markets; dangerous levels of 
competition in big cities; dealers being too well known to police; and gangs anticipating less 
resistance in provincial areas.  
Distribution of drugs must also take into account attempts to boost profits from 
retailing the drug. Profits are boosted by wholesalers mixing drugs with a cutting agent to 
increase volume. This process must be factored into the distribution chain. It also required the 
importation of sufficient volumes of cutting agents and the actual physical practice of cutting 
or mixing drugs prior to the drugs hitting the street.  Participants articulated this process, 
noting the face(s) liaised directly with wholesale distributors, who collected from various 
sites. At such sites, drugs were often mixed with a cutting agent, as Alpha explained: 
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When it (imported cocaine) arrives at the store house [in] the flats (tower blocks), it 
gets cut…We use Benzocaine at whatever ratio you are setting, given the weight. 
 
In 2016, Police Scotland (2016) raided a flat in the East end of Glasgow found drugs worth 
£1.3M including 30 kilos of Benzocaine.  
Once ‘cut’, drugs were then supplied either to groups at a similar level of 
organisation, or more usually to lower-end dealers. Retail dealers were in some cases 
upcoming criminal groups or individual players occasionally affiliated with other similar 
level suppliers. Arguably, the growing number of individuals involved in drugs markets 
meant that people were more inclined to band together to minimize risk and improve 
proficiency by strength in numbers and pulling together resources. Money made from bulk 
supply was then passed back up through the supply chain, often being deposited by criminal 
groups (like Conner’s) to the ‘faces’.  
A more contemporary modification to distribution networks appearing now in 
Scotland is ‘digital dealing’, said respondents. Drug dealing via online apps and social media 
platforms has emerged as a highly lucrative new development for Glasgow gangs. Drugs such 
as M-Cat, Mephedrone, and GBH are all easily purchased online and dispatched in small 
user-ready quantities. A 2017 BBC Documentary identified this distribution route as most 
favoured by ‘tech-savvy’ teenagers. One Glasgow gang revealed that two thirds of their drug 
transactions are now via online apps and this method of distribution can generate up to 
£22,000 of Cocaine sales in a couple of hours.   
The internet not only enabled respondents to source drugs from further afield than 
was possible in years past, but it also fed consumer demand for new illicit products: 
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Too much risk in dealing heroin mate, cunts aren’t interested in being junk balls 
nowadays anyways. Everybody is into looking pristine, hitting the gym and all that 
shit. No even kidding mate, people are selling steroids and melan-o-tan more than 
ching (Cocaine) now…. I just go online. You could type it into google shopping right 
now and it will come up. I just order it in on the [inter]net. Get it in about 3 days or 
so…. The [ste]roids are good sellers, long as you know what you are looking for. The 
tanning injections as well. Girls always buy them…. I could sell more tanning 
injections in a week than weed…. best thing is, see if you get caught, it’s a fucking 
slap on the wrist whereas see heroin mate, you’re talking serious jail time.  –Boab 
 
Boab argued that in a rapidly changing world, law enforcement could not keep up, 
thus he changed his business to exploit a gap in policy; sourcing profitable drugs that carried 
a lesser punishment should he be apprehended. For example, Boab discussed selling ‘new 
psychoactive substances’ (UNODC, 2014) or ‘legal intoxicants’ sold openly in ‘head shops’ 
alongside drug paraphernalia (BBC, 2014), that produced similar effects to illegal drugs like 
cocaine, cannabis and ecstasy. He conceded he had ‘no fuckin’ idea what [was] in them [as] 
it changes all the time’. Boab also sold the surface anaesthetic benzocaine and other 
medicines that operated in the ‘grey’ market because they were legal for medical use but 
illegal for personal use.  
Other respondents said drugs such as Valium, whilst purchased directly, were also 
stolen from the homes of prescribed users. Sometimes ‘user-dealers’ used prescription drugs 
to fund their own habits, a finding consistent with prior research on the subject (e.g., Moyle 
& Coomber, 2015):  
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Most people like a wee dunt (euphoric feeling)…..To get [a dunt]…..most addicts 
takes blues, yellas, and your prescribed meds (medication) as well….it’s easy to get 
and sell [your medication] plus it’s no’ illegal, but I have sold brown (heroin) to feed 
my own habit…..it’s no’ actual drug dealing, well suppose it is kind of, but no’ really. 
Only sell so I can get my own [fix]…..police don’t see it like that. –Gerald 
 
Discussion 
The findings from our research chart recent changes to drugs distribution networks in 
Scotland. Owing in part to adaptive risk mitigation on the part of drug dealers combined with 
issues of globalisation, we find the Scottish drugs market is in flux. We recognize that risk 
mitigation is essentially a form of displacement, which produces, at times, unintended 
consequences. Therefore, the current study contributes to a large body of work on drug 
market displacement and unintended consequences of drug enforcement (for a discussion, see 
Caulkins, 1992; Windle & Farrell, 2012). Historically, largely white, working class criminal 
cartel families with extensive criminal backgrounds controlled the Scottish market at all 
levels, as directed by kingpins in Spain and Portugal (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007).  
Distribution was conducted by middle men leveraging criminal networks or gangs shifting 
product via the commercial club scene and door security staff. But law enforcement action 
changed this, disrupting traditional distribution networks. Market diversification in supply 
and demand and enhanced competition, emerging as a result of increasing levels of 
globalisation (Storti and De Grauwe, 2009a, b), compounded this disruption. For example, 
one participant identified the rapid growth of steroids as a result of the huge rise in interest in 
bodybuilding and body image (McVeigh and Begley, 2016), and its concomitant dearth of 
enforcement compared to other drugs (e.g., heroin), thus influencing his economic decision to 
switch products.  
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Product diversification brings further adaptive distribution methods including online 
sales and 24 Hour Dial-A–Deal delivery to your front door. Such diversification offers new 
points of entry into the market. Here traditional methods of selling and dealing count for less.   
In this new marketplace, value is given to telephone databases of users rather than the 
networked knowledge of domestic markets (Densley, 2013). This, in turn, feeds into another 
driver for change—the emergence of ‘county lines’ (Coomber & Moyle, 2017).  County lines 
first became a reality for the Scottish public in 2013 with the machine-gun murder of gang 
member in the Edinburgh Suburb of Willowbrae by a group of Somali dealers who were 
living in Edinburgh and running a lucrative county line operation for a south-east London 
street gang.  This new distribution model is foregrounding several key changes to drug 
distribution in Scotland.  
First, county lines are operated by street gangs, not the traditional Glasgow or Paisley-
based crime families thus far prominent in Scottish distribution networks. Such gangs report 
back to London, Birmingham or Manchester, and so do their profits. Second, county lines are 
predicated on the use and exploitation of children or vulnerable young adults (see Coomber & 
Moyle, 2017)—‘runners’ trafficked from diverse cities in England who are not the usual 
white working class boys from Scottish housing schemes. Such operations cut out the 
traditional Scottish middleman.  It is likely, therefore, that the introduction of new players 
will fundamentally alter the ethnic homogeneity thus far present in Scottish drugs networks.   
Whilst those involved in drug distribution will often work with anyone to turn a profit, 
these changes nonetheless represent a challenge to Scottish police who might find traditional 
lines of intelligence no longer effective, and new arrival communities under-researched and 
unfamiliar—a position that gives these new players a short-term advantage. Likewise, the 
progression of disadvantaged young men from ‘social supply’ of cannabis into retail supply 
and wholesale of Class A drugs, should be noted. Research has found that economic factors 
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can account for such decisions (e.g., Windle, 2017) and we are mindful that the current study 
was conducted in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession that affected our respondents in 
ways beyond the scope of this paper. Further, the emergence of newer markets centred on 
steroid and psychoactive substances requires updated policy to address online purchasing and 
street-level distribution among young people.  
It is important to recognise the small-scale nature of our research and therefore to be 
cautious about applicability claims. However, the findings illuminate young people’s 
involvement in organised crime, and the dynamic operation of and emerging issues within drug 
markets in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2008). Given the unique insights emerging from 
the youth participant interviews, the research findings could hold the potential to more clearly 
inform policy-related discussion on the most effective means of policing drug dealing and 
preventing organised crime in Scotland.  
Our research clearly has the capacity to inform law enforcement and practitioners about 
the diverse and evolving nature of drug distribution in Scotland to improve effectiveness in 
tackling drug distribution networks. However, additional research is needed to explore and 
examine emerging markets and distribution systems because they continue to change. Echoing 
recommendations from the UK Drug Policy Commission (2008), there is a need to further 
explore and research Scottish (and UK) drug markets and how these have evolved, mapping 
structures, new players, and new trafficking networks.  Only then can policy interventions, 
refreshed partnership strategies, and community resilience start to take shape. The Scottish 
Government (2008) stated ‘reducing the supply of drugs’ was an ‘essential part’ of its harm 
reduction strategy, but recognised it needed to know more about the ‘dynamics behind the 
drugs markets’ and to be ‘alert to emerging issues so that enforcement activities can be targeted 
effectively’. Our research clearly adds to this knowledge base, enabling Scotland to become 
more effective in improving the safety and wellbeing of people, places, and communities.  
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